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155 
THE MIRANDA WARNING 
Frederick Schauer 
I. INTRODUCTION—ISOLATING MIRANDA’S IMPORT 
Largely as a consequence of American television and movies, 
Miranda v. Arizona1 may well be the most famous appellate case in the 
world. On the screen, innumerable actors playing American police 
officers give Miranda warnings to other actors playing suspects, a 
portrayal that reflects the reality of genuine police officers giving 
genuine Miranda warnings to genuine suspects millions of times every 
year. Indeed, such has been the influence of Miranda that Russian 
television cops give something like a Miranda warning to suspects even 
though no actual Russian law imposes such an obligation on real 
Russian cops.2 And it is said that in countries where no such right 
actually exists, suspects have still been known, when arrested, to 
demand their Miranda rights.3 
Among the most interesting dimensions of Miranda’s worldwide 
fame is that the case’s prominence is largely a function of the warning 
itself.4 Television and motion pictures feature Miranda warnings not 
because of any suspected viewer interest in whether suspects actually 
have a right to remain silent,5 nor on account of the underlying substance 
of the right to have a lawyer during interrogation,6 nor because the 
                                                     
 David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Visiting 
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2. See Jennifer Ryan Tishler, Menty and the Petersburg Myth: TV Cops in Russia’s “Crime 
Capital,” 10 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 127, 138 (2003). 
3. See NEAL STEPHENSON, IN THE BEGINNING . . . WAS THE COMMAND LINE 53–54 (1999). 
4. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting that Miranda is “part of our 
national culture”). 
5. Although Miranda emphatically affirms the existence of a right to remain silent, 384 U.S. at 
445–58, recognition of that right as a component of the Fifth Amendment—apart from the question 
whether (and when) a suspect or defendant must be informed of the right—long predates Miranda. 
See Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63 (1949); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 359 
(1923); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The most recent delineation of the scope 
and limits of right to remain silent is Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
6. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964). On the right to counsel during 
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general public is concerned about the right to appointed counsel for the 
indigent.7 None of this, to put it mildly, makes for good theater. What is 
good theater is the ritual of the arrest, and the Miranda warning, 
typically given in almost exactly the terms set forth in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion, is a prominent feature of the ritual, even apart from the 
role that the warning is actually designed to serve. 
Professor Kamisar—with his characteristic attention to detail in 
support of spirited argument—provides an insightful judicial and 
political history of the retrenching that has marked much of Miranda’s 
history since the Supreme Court’s decision in 1966.8 In lamenting 
Miranda’s erosion, I largely sympathize with Kamisar. But if there is a 
worry about the erosion of Miranda,9 it must be a worry not about the 
erosion of the right to remain silent itself, which existed independent of 
Miranda,10 nor about the right to counsel during interrogation, whose 
recognition and enforcement again preceded Miranda.11 Instead, it must 
                                                     
interrogation, and its relation to the right to remain silent, see Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: 
Reconsidering the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 817 
(2009). 
7. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
8. Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 88 WASH. L. REV. 965 (2012). 
9. Although I agree with much of Kamisar’s concerns about Miranda’s erosion, or shrinking, I 
part company with his belief, expressed more insistently in Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth 
Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010), that there is 
something procedurally unusual and unfortunate in so-called stealth overruling. In a world of great 
judicial candor, compare David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 
(1987), with Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990). See generally Scott C. 
Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995); Symposium, 
Tradeoffs of Candor: Does Judicial Transparency Erode Legitimacy?, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 443 (2009), the substantial erosion of Miranda by a Court unwilling to overrule it explicitly 
might be a concern, but that is not our world. Thus, the same erosion-coupled-with-denial 
phenomenon existed in, inter alia, the Supreme Court’s absurd claim in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969), that it based its decision in large part on Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494 (1951), the Court’s effective but unacknowledged (until later, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 
507 (1976)) overruling of Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
391 U.S. 308 (1968), in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and, perhaps most 
prominently, the erosion of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Although there is no article 
precisely making such a claim, I would not be surprised to find that supporters of Plessy had, from 
1938 until the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), lamented the 
“stealth overruling” of Plessy. Stealth overruling is now so common that it can hardly be considered 
stealthy, and, moreover, seems to be a common way for the Court to diminish the import of an 
unpopular precedent while waiting for the right political and legal environment to overrule it 
explicitly.  
   10. See supra note 5. 
11. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963) 
(noting unconstitutional absence of a “lawyer to advise Rideau of his right to stand mute”). 
11 - Schauer Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  6:59 PM 
2013] THE MIRANDA WARNING 157 
 
be a worry about the requirement that the police provide a warning in a 
certain way under certain conditions.12 Once we understand the import 
of various pre-Miranda decisions, we can appreciate that Miranda is 
about the warning itself, rather than about what the warning is a warning 
of. And when we understand Miranda in this way, we can focus on just 
what role the warning is designed to serve, and what the Court in 
Miranda thought it was doing in specifying almost exactly the form that 
the warning was to take. It is precisely this focus that will be the subject 
of my attention in this Response. 
In being about a warning, Miranda is about communication. 
Specifically, it is about two different dimensions of communication. One 
of these is the substance of Miranda’s holding, which is that police 
officers are required—on pain of inadmissibility of the evidence 
obtained absent a communication—to communicate to suspects under 
certain conditions their right to remain silent, to have a lawyer present 
for the interrogation, and to appointed counsel if they are indigent.13 And 
the other communicative dimension of Miranda is the way in which the 
Supreme Court communicated its requirements to police officers—the 
primary subjects of the ruling—in extraordinarily clear and rule-like 
terms. I will consider these two communicative dimensions in turn. 
II.  MIRANDA AS RULE 
Even before Miranda, involuntary confessions were plainly 
understood to violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled 
self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of due 
process.14 And even before Miranda, and still, suspects were and remain 
permitted to waive their privilege against self-incrimination.15  In theory, 
of course, the law might simply have prohibited self-incrimination, 
making the questions of waiver and voluntariness irrelevant. Thus, in a 
                                                     
12. This is not to say that Kamisar and others might not also be concerned about a possible 
erosion of the rights to remain silent and to counsel during interrogation. But although such 
concerns might run parallel to the concerns about Miranda, and might be the product of a common 
cause—decreasing Supreme Court and lower court sympathy with the rights of defendants in 
criminal cases—they would neither run through Miranda nor, except in a much more complex and 
attenuated way, be caused by any erosion of Miranda’s strength.  
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 388 U.S. 443, 444–45 (1966). 
14. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 
(1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1960); 
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. 
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
15. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
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substantially more defendant-protective world—one that exists nowhere 
in the real world as we know it—the law could simply require the police 
to make their case against a suspect without the suspect’s assistance at 
all, whether voluntary or not. Such an approach might be based on 
dramatically different views of the nature of criminal prosecution than 
the one that actually prevails in the United States and elsewhere. 
Alternatively, and slightly more plausibly, the law might be based upon 
a highly rule-based perspective on the realities of self-incrimination. Just 
as the law of evidence prohibits the use of even probative character 
evidence partially because of a fear of overvaluation or other misuse by 
the jury,16 and just as First Amendment doctrine bars almost all forms of 
viewpoint regulation in the public arena because of fears about the 
dangers of allowing to government the power to draw viewpoint-based 
distinctions,17 so too might a fear of the abuses of self-incrimination lead 
to an admittedly and substantially over-inclusive prohibition on self-
incrimination. Period. Such an approach would assuredly prevent the 
misuse or over-use of self-incriminating statements, but would do so at a 
price that no existing society appears willing to pay.18 
However unrealistic a total prohibition on self-incrimination may be, 
noting the possibility, even if only in theory, highlights the way in which 
Miranda itself can be understood as a similarly rule-based strategy for 
dealing with the problem of involuntary self-incrimination. Assuming 
that involuntary self-incrimination is indeed a problem—and a wealth of 
history and data supports the soundness of that assumption19—and 
assuming that its total prohibition is understandably off the table, 
Miranda emerges as a rule-like approach to dealing with the problem of 
involuntary self-incrimination.20 The decision produces a rule designed 
to address this problem, albeit a rule less stringent than total prohibition, 
                                                     
16. FED. R. EVID. 404; see Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective 
on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912 (2012); David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character 
Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial By Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161 
(1998).  
17. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Joseph 
Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461 
(1986).  
18. Indeed, the conclusion in the text is implicit in the fact that, at least in the United States, a 
simple requirement that a lawyer be present for any interrogation has never attracted significant 
support. See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1023. 
19. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010).  
20. See Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions 
in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 643–44 (2006). 
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less stringent than even a requirement that counsel be present at all 
interrogations, and less stringent than even a requirement that counsel be 
present for any valid waiver of the right to remain silent. Nevertheless, it 
is important to remember that the underlying goal of the rule represented 
by Miranda is to lessen involuntary self-incrimination. That is what lies 
in the background of the entire debate. Genuinely voluntary self-
incrimination remains constitutionally permissible, and thus 
distinguishing genuinely voluntary self-incrimination from involuntary 
self-incrimination, as well as guarding against involuntary self-
incrimination, is the aim of this entire area of constitutional doctrine.21 
Although Professor Kamisar and many others (including myself) decry 
the old voluntariness test,22 it is important to bear in mind that 
involuntariness is still the real concern. A test—or rule, if you will—is 
different from a goal. If the involuntariness test is mistaken, which 
Kamisar correctly thinks it is, it is not because we have identified the 
wrong goal, but because the involuntariness test is a poor way of 
implementing the involuntariness goal, for all of the reasons that 
Kamisar persuasively explains.23 
So if lessening or eliminating involuntary confessions—but not all 
confessions and not even all non-counsel-advised confessions—is the 
goal, it would then seem that the obvious solution would be to prohibit 
exactly what we are concerned with. And, indeed, this was long the 
approach, as exemplified in the voluntariness test and in a raft of pre-
Miranda decisions.24 If involuntary confessions are the real danger, then 
why not simply prohibit involuntary confessions, and prohibit using 
their products? After all, in numerous other areas, the law directly 
prohibits just what it wants to lessen. The prohibitions on murder, rape, 
larceny, burglary, and the sale of narcotics, for example, are couched 
almost completely and directly in the terms of the actual social concern. 
Yet although such direct prohibitions are widespread, so too are less 
direct ones. The immediate target of numerous legal prohibitions is 
something other than, or something more than, exactly what the law 
                                                     
21. There are shades of difference among involuntariness, coercion, compulsion, and related 
ideas, but sorting out the differences is far afield from the focus of this Response. It is worth noting, 
however, that a careful examination of the very idea of coercion in all of its philosophical, 
psychological, political, sociological, and economic dimensions—ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 
(1987), would be an excellent starting place—might usefully inform answering the question whether 
the very idea of voluntariness best captures the important underlying concerns. 
22. E.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865 (1981); 
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 102. 
23. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1025–32. 
24. See cases cited in supra notes 5, 6, 10, 11.  
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seeks to eliminate (or, at times, encourage). Such prohibitions, however, 
must still be understood as but indirect approaches to serving the same 
goal as direct ones. Prohibitions on possessing the instrumentalities of 
crime—burglar tools25 or drug paraphernalia26—fit this mold, and in 
many other domains legal goals are commonly embodied only indirectly, 
and only probabilistically.27 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,28 for 
example, is premised on the idea that true statements about public 
officials (and, later, public figures29) should flourish and false ones 
should not. The Sullivan rule is cruder, however, granting protection to 
many false statements in order that the maximum number of true ones 
will be published.30 Similarly, the Sherman Act seeks to prevent trade-
restraining business practices, but the various per se rules that the 
Supreme Court has adopted to effectuate the Sherman Act’s deeper goals 
are ones that may punish or deter non-trade-restraining practices in order 
to accomplish the background goals most effectively.31 And among the 
purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
                                                     
25. The indirect nature of prohibitions on burglar tools is especially obvious when prosecutions 
are aimed at the possession of individually benign items whose possession in combination is far 
more suspicious. See, e.g., People v. O.M., No. H023435, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6565 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2002) (six broken spark plugs—commonly used for breaking glass silently); 
People v. Trimmer, No. A095983, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6520 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 
2002) (crowbar, hacksaw, and lock pick); Burgess v. Bintz, No. 00 CIV. 8271, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7168 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2002) (crowbar and bent coat hanger). 
26. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5701(f)(12)(B) (L) (Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4-
403a (2010). 
27. See Frederick Schauer, Bentham on Presumed Offences, 23 UTILITAS 363 (2011). 
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
29. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
30. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring). And 
thus I agree with Kamisar and others, for example, Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles 
of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2001); David Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and 
Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001), that the use of rules— rules simpliciter— is ubiquitous in 
constitutional law, and that there is no special category of prophylactic rules. Every constitutional 
rule, whether the rule emanating from Sullivan, or the four-part test for commercial speech 
restrictions in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980), or the intermediate scrutiny rule for sex discrimination that protects men as 
well as women, Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), will encompass more than 
would direct application of the rule embodied in the constitutional text, precisely because such over-
inclusion (as well as under-inclusion) is just how rules operate, and just what rules are. See 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) [hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES]. 
The phrase “prophylactic rule” is accordingly best seen as a simple redundancy, sort of like “null 
and void” or “cease and desist.”  
31. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (price-fixing); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price maintenance), overruled by Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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of 1934 is the prevention of trading on inside information, but Section 
16(b) of the 1934 Act, rather than simply prohibiting insider trading, 
penalizes (through civil liability) with a sharp-edged rule a wide swath 
of so-called short-swing trades—most but not all of which will involve 
the actual trading on inside information that is the statute’s real goal.32 
And perhaps most pervasively, traffic laws aim to achieve safe driving 
not simply by punishing unsafe or imprudent or unreasonable driving, 
but by the use of crisply delineated speed limits, recognizing that such 
limits may well over-deter some safe driving and under-deter some 
unsafe driving.33 
Viewed through this lens of indirect prohibitions in the service of a 
goal that might be served less effectively with a direct prohibition, many 
questions surrounding Miranda are now transformed. Professor Kamisar 
sees the controversy about Miranda, and the ebbs and flows (mostly 
ebbs) of its political and judicial history, largely in terms of a battle 
between pro-police and pro-defendant (or, better, pro-defendants’ rights) 
forces. In this he appears largely correct, but we need to examine more 
carefully the missing steps that would support his conclusion. Just what 
makes a direct prohibition on exactly what we are concerned with—a 
straightforward prohibition on involuntary confessions—a pro-police 
stance, and Miranda’s actual and indirect rule requiring disclosure a pro-
defendant or pro-rights one? 
As with most rule-based approaches to more broadly defined 
problems, the concern here is with mistakes in applying the broadly 
phrased rule.34 More specifically, the concern about direct application of 
a voluntariness standard is not just a replay of the traditional debates 
between rules and standards.35 Rather, it is primarily a worry that 
potential mistakes under a broadly worded standard would tilt 
systematically in one direction rather than another—that involuntary 
statements would be found to be voluntary far more often than voluntary 
statements would be found to be involuntary. Indeed, such a skewing of 
mistakes should not be surprising. It is a necessary characteristic of all 
                                                     
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (Supp. 2011). 
33. See Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155 
(1999). 
34. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING 13–35, 188–202 (2009) [hereinafter SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER]; 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 30 passim. 
35. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 181 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000). 
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claimants of Miranda rights that they have at one point been suspects, 
broadly defined, and it is a necessary characteristic of all claimants of 
Miranda rights in court that they are defendants in criminal cases. And it 
is a non-necessary but contingent truth that most criminal defendants are 
guilty of the crimes with which they have been charged, and that many 
of those who are not guilty of the crimes with which they are charged are 
guilty of other crimes, crimes often identical to or resembling or 
associated with the crimes with which they have been charged.36 Only 
on television, in the movies, and in page-turner crime novels do totally 
innocent individuals constitute a high percentage of the defendants in the 
criminal cases that are brought to trial. 
That most defendants are guilty does not suggest that a concern with 
their rights is misguided.37 Even the guilty have rights to procedural 
fairness. Moreover, the existence of procedural rights for the guilty 
lessens the likelihood of prosecuting, convicting, and punishing the 
innocent—as Blackstone and others recognized centuries ago.38 But the 
fact that the bearers of defendants’ rights are systematically unappealing 
individuals, largely because of their guilt, goes a long way towards 
explaining a fear that the rights such individuals properly claim may be 
under-recognized in practice. And thus, more specifically, the fact that 
the confessions of those whose confessions may have been obtained by 
trickery or even force have a substantial likelihood of actually being true 
will make it predictably and systematically the case that such 
involuntary confessions will be deemed voluntary far more often than 
voluntary confessions will be found to be involuntary.39 
                                                     
36. This conclusion is an extrapolation from existing figures on guilty pleas (some of which will 
admittedly be by innocent defendants) and on conviction rates at trial (some of which will be 
erroneous), see THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCELHAHN, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES, 2006 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf; 
Felony Defendants, Summary of Findings, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=231 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013), but even the most 
conservative extrapolation is sufficient to support the point in the text.  
37. Gerard V. Bradley, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Defendant’s Obligation to Plead 
Guilty, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 65 (1999), supports the conclusion that most defendants are actually 
guilty, but takes that conclusion as grounding an obligation on the part of guilty defendants to plead 
guilty, a conclusion with which I disagree, even though I agree with Bradley’s factual premise. 
38. “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. For interesting discussions and analysis of the Blackstonian 
maxim and its historical and contemporary variants, see Larry Laudan, TRUTH, ERROR AND 
CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (2006); Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
39. And thus Kamisar is correct to distinguish disapproval of police methods of obtaining a 
confession from the unreliability of that confession. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 967. It is true that 
involuntary confessions are less likely reliable than, say, contraband seized in violation of the 
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Because the direct application of a vague voluntariness test will thus 
result in errors of a systematically skewed variety, the attractiveness of a 
rather more concrete—and thus error-minimizing40—rule becomes more 
apparent. But why this rule? Why should the Constitution be interpreted 
to require a warning, rather than a signed waiver, a witnessed waiver, an 
attorney-advised waiver, a witnessed or recorded interrogation, or any of 
some number of other devices that would more straightforwardly specify 
and make more precise (more of a rule) the less precise (more of a 
standard) idea of voluntariness? 
It is not clear what the answer to this question is. Nor is it clear what 
the Supreme Court in Miranda thought the answer was. It is also not 
clear Kamisar has an answer either, except that he believes that at least 
some of these remedies—mandatory attorney presence, for example—
would be politically impossible.41 But in his discussion of Mincey v. 
Arizona,42 Kamisar does expose and discuss the weaknesses of the 
voluntariness test in an environment in which case-by-case 
determinations of voluntariness are logistically burdensome and likely to 
be systematically skewed in the direction of excess deference to 
determinations below.43 This is especially apparent in Mincey itself, 
involving determinations made first by police officers, and then by 
prosecutors, and then by elected trial judges, and then by elected state 
appellate judges.44 One need not accuse any of these actors of bad faith 
to suspect that all the incentives for all of them are in the direction of 
                                                     
Fourth Amendment, but only in the world of fantasy are all of the procedures we find morally or 
constitutionally impermissible (or both) also ineffective. Torture is of course the obvious example, 
but coerced confessions present the same issues. Indeed, although Kamisar is right to castigate the 
inflammatory political rhetoric that followed Miranda, Kamisar, supra note 8, at 972–75, it seems 
unlikely that the panoply of decisions protecting defendants’ rights would have no effect on the 
crime-restricting abilities of the police and thus no effect on the crime rate. Obviously, sorting out 
individual causal influences in a world of multiple causation is always difficult and often 
impossible. Other factors—education, poverty, the general economic environment, and much else—
plainly influence the crime rate. Still, the rhetorical excesses of Senator McClennan, then-candidate 
Nixon, and many others should not obscure the likelihood that making things marginally more 
difficult for the police will make things marginally less difficult for those the police are attempting 
to apprehend or restrict.  
40. More precisely, a rule would be discretion-minimizing, and would thus lessen the errors 
occasioned by misuse of that discretion. As with any rule, however, minimizing these errors would 
be bought at the cost of increasing the number of errors of rule-dependent under-inclusion and over-
inclusion. See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 30, at 149–55; SCHAUER, THINKING 
LIKE A LAWYER, supra note 34, at 29–35. 
41. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1023. 
42. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
43. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 968–70.  
44. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387–88. 
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under-protecting Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Claiming to 
be a stronger protector of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights is 
not, in general, a strategy designed to win elections for district attorney 
or (elected) judge. And it is the rare police department that bases 
promotion of its officers—short of behavior incurring civil liability—
very much on the vigor with which they guard the rights of suspects. 
Yet even if the circumstances of Mincey underscore the need for a 
rule-based approach, it is far less clear why the rule effectuating the goal 
of voluntariness would focus on the warning, rather than on some crisp 
indicator of voluntariness or involuntariness. We can understand 
somewhat easily the relationship between the per se rule against price 
fixing and the Sherman Act’s prohibition on contracts, combinations, 
and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce.45 And we can 
understand (even if not necessarily agree with) the relationship between 
a “best interests of the child” standard and its (historically) frequently 
instantiating rule creating a strong presumption in favor of granting 
custody to the mother.46 But the relationship between the voluntariness 
idea and the rule in Miranda seems somewhat less direct and thus 
somewhat harder to tease out. 
Typically, rules use statistically reliable instantiations of their 
background justifications as their operative triggers, as with the 
operative trigger of a numerical speed limit, which is a statistically 
reliable but not perfect instantiation of unsafe driving. These operative 
triggers are the imperfect but probabilistically useful indicators of the 
furtherance of their background justifications. Price-fixing typically but 
not necessarily indicates a hindrance (restraint) of trade; and, 
historically, maternal custody was a statistically reliable indicator of 
furthering a child’s best interests. In the context of Miranda, therefore, 
the claim would be that receiving a warning—which is what Miranda 
requires and what makes the case distinctive—is a statistically reliable 
indicator that a subsequent waiver was voluntary. This may well be true, 
but note that it does require a series of inferential links—from a 
suspect’s receipt of the warning to the suspect’s appreciating the content 
of the warning to the suspect’s recognizing that waivers are not required 
to the suspect signing a waiver voluntarily. Each of these steps may well 
be statistically justified, but it is hardly obvious that they are. Indeed, 
there is some indication that one or more may not be.47 Consequently, if 
                                                     
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
46. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender in the Law: Revaluing the 
Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2008). 
47. See Kassin et al., supra note 19. 
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genuine voluntariness is the background justification, and if we 
understand, as we should, that background justifications may often be 
better served by crisp and probabilistically reliable instantiations than by 
direct application of the background justification, it is hardly obvious 
that picking the providing of a warning is the best or the most 
statistically reliable way of instantiating the background concern with 
voluntariness. 
Thus, it is important to distinguish two different possible concerns 
about voluntariness. One is that voluntariness is simply the wrong 
idea—that voluntariness as the background goal is itself misguided. But 
this seems not to be Kamisar’s concern, nor that of other defenders of 
Miranda. And thus the second concern, which does appear to be 
Kamisar’s, is that voluntariness may be a sufficiently slippery standard 
such that courts, in applying it directly, will be especially inclined to find 
against a defendant for any of a number of reasons.48 If this is so, 
however, and I believe it to be so, and if voluntariness remains as the 
appropriate background justification even if not the appropriate 
instantiating rule, then there needs to be some indication that some other 
instantiating rule is less prone to mistakes in application while still being 
a serviceable instantiation of the background justification. Kamisar and 
others are persuasive in showing us why and how Miranda satisfies the 
former—how it might be less prone to skewed mistakes in application.49 
But the defenders of Miranda have focused less than they should on 
demonstrating why the Miranda instantiation of the voluntariness 
background justification is more statistically well-tailored to serving the 
background justification than might some number of other similarly 
mistake-avoiding instantiations. We can be confident that some indicia 
of voluntariness—signing a waiver, for example—may be quite poor 
indicators of voluntariness, and even less statistically reliable than a 
Miranda warning. But what remains to be shown is that a Miranda 
warning, even when coupled with a voluntariness backup,50 is a better 
rule than some number of alternatives. Perhaps it is, but the best defense 
of Miranda will recognize that compliance with Miranda may be an 
attenuated indicator of voluntariness, and that non-compliance may be 
an attenuated indicator of involuntariness. Without responding to this 
concern, the defenders of Miranda may wind up offering simple pro-
rights versus pro-police arguments that will fail to persuade anyone on 
                                                     
48. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 967–70. 
49. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1026–38. 
50. See United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2009) (Miranda warnings given, but 
subsequent statements excluded as involuntary). 
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the other side. 
III.  MIRANDA AS GUIDANCE 
It is thus at least arguable that Miranda is a coarse and clumsy 
instantiation of the deeper behavior—genuine voluntariness—that the 
Miranda rule is designed to indicate. But Miranda may fare somewhat 
better when we turn to a different aspect of its communicative 
dimension. That is, Miranda may be of questionable effectiveness in 
conveying to courts and others the behavior that the Miranda warning is 
designed to indicate. But the case may be considerably more effective in 
conveying from courts, and in particular from the Supreme Court, the 
behavior that is required of primary actors. 
Thus, the Court—having decided that the appropriate way of 
guaranteeing genuine voluntariness in waivers, as well as of simply 
assuring that suspects know of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights51—might simply have ruled that suspects must be adequately 
apprised of their rights. Had this been the outcome of Miranda or of a 
Miranda-like case, courts would then be required to assess whether 
some notification to suspects of their rights was sufficiently adequate, in 
much the same way that courts assess reasonableness or adequacy or 
satisfaction of some other largely indeterminate standard in numerous 
other areas of law, particularly constitutional law.52 
The Supreme Court, as we know, did not take that course. Instead it 
came very close to mandating the exact script that the police were to use 
in communicating with suspects.53 Indeed, it is just this dimension of 
Miranda that has played such a large role in ensuring the case’s iconic 
status. Were police notifications less formulaic, Miranda warnings 
would make far worse theater. It is precisely the fact that most real 
police officers and most movie and television police officers say exactly 
                                                     
51. That is, there is presumably a value in people knowing what the law is, and knowing what 
their rights are, independent of that knowledge’s instrumental value in fostering insistence on those 
rights or in deterring rights-restricting official behavior. 
52. Examples are legion, but a list of the most prominent ones would include the determination 
whether a state law is sufficiently rational or reasonable to survive minimal due process or equal 
protection scrutiny (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)), whether a restriction 
on abortion places an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose (Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 
914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)), whether government 
entanglement with religion is excessive (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)), or whether 
alternative forums for communication (United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)) or raising 
claims (South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984)) are adequate. 
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–73 (1966). See also id. at 444, where the Court notes 
that it is setting forth the requirements with “some specificity.” 
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the same thing at roughly the same time in the arrest sequence which 
makes Miranda so memorable. The so-called Miranda card is pretty 
close to the inscribed text of a Supreme Court opinion, and thus we have 
a situation in which the Supreme Court is giving direct and explicit 
guidance to primary actors—police officers—on how to behave and how 
to comply with the Court’s ruling. 
This approach is, to put it mildly, rare. With annoying frequency, the 
Supreme Court chooses vagueness over specificity, preferring, it seems, 
to keep its options open for future cases rather than give clear guidance 
now, even if in doing so it admittedly constrains itself in the future.54 
The Court has not, for example, told trial judges or litigants what is 
necessary in order for an expert witness to be qualified as such or expert 
evidence to be admissible. Instead it has elected to list a series of factors, 
leaving unspecified which factors are individually necessary, and how 
many factors (and in what combination) are sufficient.55 Much the same 
applies to the Court’s non-specification in any useful detail of what 
counts as “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause,56 or of 
which forms of student speech teachers and school administrators must 
allow in order to comply with the First Amendment,57 or of which 
Christmas displays will violate the Establishment Clause.58 
All of these examples are ones, like the interrogations at issue in 
Miranda, in which the Court is assuredly speaking to vast numbers of 
primary actors encountering constitutionally precarious events on a daily 
basis. Where the Court is speaking only to Congress, say, and only with 
respect to relatively uncommon occurrences—most separation of powers 
controversies fit this description59—to say nothing of almost unique 
                                                     
54. I have discussed this on several previous occasions, albeit not in the context of Miranda. See 
Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 
205 [hereinafter Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function]; Frederick Schauer, Opinions as 
Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995); see also Frank Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982). 
55. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
56. See Williams v. Illinois, 564 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
57. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); see Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function, 
supra note 54. 
58. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
59. E.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 
(1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); United 
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scenarios such as that in Bush v. Gore60—there might be little need for 
the Court to provide direct guidance. Case-by-case determination in such 
contexts is manageable, the costs of rule-based errors are large, and the 
advantages of rules in providing predictability for hundreds or thousands 
or more primary actors are largely beside the point. 
By contrast, in a context in which a Supreme Court decision deals 
with an issue arising thousands of times a year, or, as with Miranda, 
thousands of times a day throughout the United States, and in which the 
Supreme Court itself hears only about eighty cases a year and even the 
federal courts of appeals and the state appellate courts are heavily over-
burdened, one might expect the Court to be more concerned than it now 
is or has been for years with providing direct and thus litigation-
forestalling guidance. From this perspective, Miranda and the “Miranda 
card” are noteworthy outliers. 
The Miranda approach to guidance—detailed and specific guidance 
aimed at primary actors—does not come without costs. Indeed, the 
strongest argument for the opposite approach is that such guidance is too 
Procrustean, forcing a wide diversity of behavior into a distortingly 
narrow model. There are, to use the examples above, wide varieties of 
expertise and expert evidence, statements to police officers, Christmas 
displays, and student speech. To attempt to lay down in advance—
concretely and specifically—the appropriate way of dealing with this 
diversity of behavior is inevitably to commit to making and tolerating 
some number of mistakes in application. 
So too, it might be argued, with rights notifications to suspects. Some 
suspects will be more able to understand the meaning and import of the 
typical Miranda warning, and others less. Some situations will make a 
warning relatively easy, and others will be very difficult. To attempt in 
advance to deal with all of these diverse situations with a standard one-
size-fits-all warning is destined to failure. Or so it could be argued. 
This objection is in one sense sound. For the Supreme Court to give 
this kind of detailed guidance to police departments and officers about 
constitutionally permissible police behavior would run the risk of some 
number of “mistakes.” In some cases, compliance with the precise 
Miranda strictures would produce at least presumptive legal and 
constitutional permissibility even though the warning might not be fully 
adequate to apprise suspects of their rights. And in others non-
                                                     
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952). 
60. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Similarly likely non-repeatable and rare is Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 
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compliance would produce unconstitutionality and consequent exclusion 
even though the non-complying warning would actually have provided 
the information sufficient to provide some suspect with everything he or 
she needed to understand their rights and then decide knowingly whether 
to waive them or not. 
Such suboptimal outcomes in individual cases, however, are an 
inevitable part of any process of rule-based decision-making.61 The real 
question, then, is whether custodial interrogation represents a context in 
which the advantages of rule-based decision-making and rule-based 
guidance—notice, predictability, constraint on discretion, and the like—
outweigh the principal disadvantage of under- and over-inclusion vis-à-
vis the rule’s background justification. And in this context there is a 
strong argument that the advantages of crisp rules outweigh the 
disadvantages. We are dealing with a very frequent and repeatable event, 
and one in which the primary actors—the interrogating police officers—
are typically not themselves legally trained, nor do they often have 
access to legal advice at the time of making a decision with 
constitutional implications. And we are dealing with a situation in which 
the incentives of those primary actors diverge substantially from the 
incentives of those—the courts, principally—who are primarily charged 
with the protection of constitutional rights. As such, custodial 
interrogation—along with many other street-level police practices—
represents a situation in which notice, consistency, and predictability are 
likely more important than the flexibility to deal with currently 
unimagined situations. All of these considerations thus point in the 
direction of a rule-based approach. Consequently, we can see not only 
the Miranda warning itself as a rule, but also the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miranda about what the warning should say as a rule, albeit 
one made and implemented at a different level. 
CONCLUSION 
My differences with Professor Kamisar are slight. But there are 
differences in tone that are worth noting. For Kamisar, Miranda’s 
subsequent history is a proxy for a larger and deeper battle between pro-
police and pro-defendants’ rights forces.62 Kamisar sees himself, the 
Miranda majority, and the post-Miranda advocates of Miranda 
preservation as belonging to the latter side in this battle, with the 
Miranda dissenters—the judicial Miranda skeptics such as Chief 
                                                     
61. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). 
62. And perhaps between liberals and conservatives. See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 976. 
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Justices Burger and Rehnquist, and scholars such as Fred Inbau—all 
belonging to the former.63 
In drawing the battle lines in this way, Kamisar has tapped into a 
genuine judicial and constitutional division, one that has occasionally—
as in the 1968 election—erupted into the political arena. But Miranda’s 
virtues are not just that it is a marker for one side of a longstanding 
debate, standing alongside Mapp v. Ohio,64 Gideon v. Wainwright,65 and 
a host of other Warren-era decisions which properly, in my view, reflect 
the way in which rights protected under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments cannot plausibly, because of the systematic 
unattractiveness of those who claim and defend them, be protected other 
than by strong and unpopular judicial intervention. Rather, Miranda is 
also important for the way in which it embodies the Supreme Court’s 
occasional but increasingly rare willingness to understand its role as law-
maker, rule-maker, and promulgator of standards of conduct for primary 
and constitutionally constrained actors. Recognizing Miranda’s 
substantive outcome with respect to an important dimension of modern 
American constitutional criminal procedure is important. But so too is 
recognizing the importance of Miranda in demonstrating—as post-
Miranda popular culture has made clear—that the Supreme Court has 
the capacity to give clear and crisp instructions to the primary actors 
whose constitutional compliance is essential to a constitutional system. 
Would that the Court do so more often. 
                                                     
63. In light of his larger story, and the roles played by the principal characters in it, Kamisar 
struggles to make sense of Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Kamisar, supra note 8, 
at 1002–08. But it is probably best simply to understand Dickerson as a skirmish in an entirely 
different battle, a battle in which Chief Justice Rehnquist is best seen as carrying the judicial 
supremacy banner of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), Nevada Department of Human Resources 
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), among others cases, 
against the departmentalists and popular constitutionalists. Compare Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) 
(defending judicial supremacy), with Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: 
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (decrying judicial supremacy). However one 
comes out on these debates, it should be clear that any debate that puts Abraham Lincoln, Edwin 
Meese, Larry D. Kramer (We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001)), and Michael Stokes Paulsen 
(The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217 (1994)) 
on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and a unanimous Warren Court (in Cooper) on the other 
defies conventional political categorization. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending 
Judicial Supremacy, 17 CONST. COMM. 455 (2000). And thus Dickerson is probably best understood 
as having remarkably little to do with Miranda at all. 
64. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
65. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
